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Property Ownership Versus the Right To Vote:
A Question of Equal Protection
In October 1970 the Montgomery Independent School District held a bond
election seeking approval of general obligation bonds which would be paid
from the levy of ad valorem taxes. Because of uncertainty over the laws con-
cerning voter qualifications,1 two separate but simultaneous elections were
conducted. At one election only the qualified electors of the school district who
owned taxable real or personal property in the district and who had duly
rendered their property for taxation were allowed to vote. These voters re-
jected the bond issue. At the other election all other qualified resident voters
of the district were permitted to vote. These voters approved the bond issue.
When all the votes were added together, the majority of all who voted in the
bond election had approved issuance of the bonds. In December 1970 the
school board authorized the issuance of the bonds and levied an ad valorem tax.
The Texas attorney general refused to approve the issue.' The school district
then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for a writ of mandamus directing
the attorney general to approve an issue of $450,000 of the district's Un-
limited Tax Schoolhouse Bonds. The school district contended that the chal-
lenged Texas laws were violative of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Held, writ denied: Al-
though the Texas constitutional and statutory provisions restrict the right to
vote in school bond elections to real and personal property owners who have
rendered their property for taxation, that class of persons is so all-inclusive as
to constitute no violation of the equal protection clause. Montgomery Inde-
pendent School District v. Martin, 464 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1971).
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND RESTRICTIONS
ON THE RIGHT To VOTE
The United States Supreme Court has established two basic standards by
which it may categorize cases involving equal protection issues. The first may
be termed the "traditional test of reasonableness." This test allows a challenged
'The qualifications for voting in a Texas school bond election were expressed by two
constitutional provisions and one statutory requirement. TEX. CONST, art. VI, § 3a provides:
When an election is held . . . for the purpose of issuing bonds or otherwise
lending credit, or expending money or assuming any debt, only qualified
electors who own taxable property in the State, county, political sub-division,
district, city, town or village where such election is held, and who have duly
rendered the same for taxation, shall be qualified to vote ....
TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 3 authorizes the levy and execution of ad valorem taxes, within
limits, with this proviso: "[P]rovided that a majority of the qualified property tax-paying
voters of the district voting at an election to be held for that purpose shall vote . . . such
tax. ... TEx. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 20.04 (1969) reads: "No such bonds shall be issued
and none of the aforesaid taxes shall be levied unless authorized by a majority of the resi-
dent, qualified electors of the district, who own taxable property therein and who have duly
rendered the same for taxation, voting at an election held for such purpose . ... "
' The Texas Education Code requires that all bonds of a school district and the pro-
ceeding authorizing their issuance must be submitted to the attorney general of Texas for
examination. If the attorney general finds that the bonds have been authorized in accordance
with the law, he shall approve them for issuance. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN, $ 20.06 (1969).
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classification to stand as long as it is not irrational, arbitrary, or unreasonable!
The second may be characterized as the "compelling state interest test." This
test requires a balancing of state and individual interests, and is the more de-
manding of the two tests.4 The compelling state interest test will supersede
the reasonableness test only when certain elements are involved.!
The reasonableness test is based upon the philosophy that "[sitate legis-
latures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the
fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality."' Therefore, a ques-
tionable classification will not be declared violative of the equal protection
clause if any facts reasonably justify the classification.! The rationale for such
a position is simply that the Supreme Court is reluctant to substitute its own
judgment for that of the legislature.
Nevertheless, when suspect criteria or fundamental rights are involved,' the
Court requires the application of the compelling state interest test.1" This stand-
ard is equivalent to a balancing process, balancing the rights of individuals
against the interest sought to be achieved by the state. The more significant
and important the individual right is, the more persuasive and compelling the
state interest must be for the legislation to be sustained. The presumption
favoring the constitutionality of legislative classifications is disregarded in
situations that involve suspect criteria or fundamental rights."'
' See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Allied Stores of Ohio,
Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).4Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). See generally 30 OHIO L.J. 202(1969). See also Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the
"Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 716 (1969).
*The elements referred to include the presence of suspect criteria or fundamental rights,
both of which are discussed at note 9 infra.
'McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
7 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
' "Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures,
not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 729 (1963).
'"Suspect criteria" usually concern classifications that deal with discrimination against
race, color, creed, or religion; whereas, "fundamental rights" deal with those rights that the
Supreme Court has from time to time classified as being within the realm of the term
"fundamental." The following are examples of some rights that the Court has termed as
"fundamental": Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (the right to move from
state to state); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (the right to marry); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (the first amendment freedoms of association and
expression); Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (the right to have children);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (the right to vote). See also Karst, supra
note 4, at 732-46.1 In order to satisfy the compelling state interest test the traditional test for reasonable-
ness must necessarily have been met. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
A precise definition of compelling state interest has yet to be reached by the Court;
however, it appears that a state interest is "compelling" if the Court is persuaded to suppress
an individual right. Therefore, rather than developing a strict definition of compelling state
interest, the Court has chosen to deal with the problem on a case-by-case basis. As a result,
there now exists a diversity of situations in which the Court has classified state interests as
compelling or noncompelling. For example, in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966), the Court invalidated a poll tax provision on the basis that it failed to
promote a compelling state interest. Likewise, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-34
(1969), the Court stated that the fiscal integrity of a state is not a compelling state interest
so as to justify the infringement of fundamental rights. See Comment, Limitations on the
Voting Franchise and the Standard of Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 1970
UTAH L. Ray. 143, 146.
"
1Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969).
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Property Ownership as a Prerequisite to the Right To Vote. No right is so
precious and fundamental to a democratic society as the right to vote.' Despite
the importance of this right, the Supreme Court has decided that the states
have the power to condition the franchise." The Court has held that the lan-
guage of the Constitution and its amendments do not alter or destroy the
state's power to determine qualifications for voting.4 Indeed, as late as 1959,
while upholding a North Carolina literacy test as a valid prerequisite to vote,
the Court was of the opinion that "[t]he States have . . . broad powers to
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised."' "
One of the leading cases regarding the relationship between the equal pro-
tection clause and the franchise was Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections."
In Harper the Court faced the question of whether the Virginia poll tax was a
valid prerequisite to voting in a general election. The Court concluded that
whenever the affluence of the voter is made an electoral standard there is a
violation of the equal protection clause.' This decision was based on the theory
that "[v]oter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying this [poll
tax] or any other tax.""1s The Court held that the right to vote was "too
precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned."'" Although the
Court was not faced with the question of property ownership as a qualification
to vote, it is significant to note that Mr. Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion,
viewed the opinion of the majority as being applicable to property ownership
qualifications.'"
The principles in Harper reappeared in Kramer v. Union Free School Dis-
trict No. 15." The issue in Kramer was whether the State of New York could
limit the right to vote in school board elections to those qualified electors who
owned or leased taxable real property within the school district or had children
enrolled in the local public schools." The plaintiff contended that such voting
requirements prohibited him from exercising his right to vote and, therefore,
violated the equal protection clause." The Court, agreeing with the plaintiff's
"The right to vote first received judicial recognition as a fundamental right in 1886
when it was recognized as preservative of all other rights. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886).
"Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959); Pope v.
Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1904).
'" The equal protection clause did not fully emerge as a device to invalidate state statutes
that infringe upon voting rights until the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186(1962). Prior to Baker most state statutes that infringed upon voting rights were upheld by
the Court on the premise that the right to vote was not one of the privileges and immunities
protected by the fourteenth amendment. Hence, the effect of such decisions was to ignore
the application of the equal protection clause to voting rights. See, e.g., Lassiter v. North-
ampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); Breedlove v. Shuttles, 302 U.S. 277(1937); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904). But see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927).
" Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
16383 U.S. 663 (1966).
1 Id. at 666.
18Id.
'9 Id. at 670.
'
0 ld. at 683 (Harlan, J., dissenting): "But today in holding unconstitutional state poll
tax and property qualifications for voting .. " However, Mr. Justice Harlan failed to give
any significant indication as to why he interpreted the majority opinion as he did.
" 395 U.S. 621 (1969). For a general discussion of Kramer, see Young, Review of
Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 55 A.B.A.J. 1074, 1078 (1969).
"See N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 2012 (McKinney 1969).
'Plaintiff was a 31-year-old, college-educated stockbroker who lived with his parents in
1971]
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contention, relied on Harper and stated that "once the franchise is granted to
the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause . 2.4.."' The challenged New York statute was held invalid
because it failed to sufficiently limit the franchise to those who had a direct
interest in school affairs.' The case was then remanded to the district court for
a determination of whether the state had a compelling interest in limiting the
franchise.'
Cipriano v. City of Houma"7 extended the rule in Kramer to elections for
the approval of revenue bonds. The issue in Cipriano was whether a state could
extend exclusively to property owners the right to vote in an election called to
approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility. 8 The Court
found the limitation unconstitutional, and further emphasized the close scrutiny
and exacting standards required of a statute that selectively distributed the right
to vote to those with a "special interest. "" The effect of Cipriano was to pro-
hibit a state from using property ownership as a prerequisite for voting in
revenue bond elections.
: The Court faced the problem of determining whether the general principles
of Cipriano could be applied to the exclusion of nonproperty owners in general
obligation bond elections in City of Phoenix v. Kolodzieski.0 In that case the
right to vote in general obligation bond elections was limited to real property
owners. Although it was conceded that this precise issue (approval of general
obligation bonds) was never approached in Cipriano, the Court concluded that
the principles of Cipriano, as well as Kramer, were applicable in Phoenix."' For
several reasons the Court was of the opinion that the distinction between the
interests of real property owners and nonproperty owners was insufficient to
deprive the latter of the franchise." The Court sought to put to rest any con-
the Union Free School District No. 15. He was a bachelor, had no children, and neither
owned nor leased taxable real property. Otherwise, he satisfied the age, citizenship, and
residency requirements to vote.
395 U.S. at 629.
'The Court noted an example of the problem presented in Kramer by way of a foot-
note, in which it stated: "[A]ppellant resides with his parents in the school district, pays
state and federal taxes and is interested in and affected by school board decisions; however,
he has no vote. On the other hand, an uninterested unemployed young man who pays no
state or federal taxes, but who rents an apartment in the district, can participate in the
election." Id. at 632 n.15.
" Despite the fact that the Court failed to determine whether a compelling state interest
was present, Kramer is especially significant for establishing basic constitutional principles
and standards by which one may scrutinize voting restrictions.
27395 U.S. 701 (1969). For a general discussion of Cipriano, see Young, supra note 21,
at 1078.
" 395 U.S. at 702.
29 Id. at 706. Since all members of the electorate were substantially affected by the opera-
tion of the public utility, the Court considered it a violation of equal protection to exclude
nonproperty owners on the basis of a different opinion they might hold regarding the bond
election. It was generally thought that the property owners favored the bond issue since an
improvement of the city's utility operations would produce additional revenues which would
eventually have the effect of reducing the burden on the property owner to support city
services. On the other hand, nonproperty taxpayers would generally oppose the issue since
it would result in a rate increase for the use of the utility without the benefits realized by
real P roperty taxpayers. Id. at 705.
" 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
11 1d. at 208-09.
'The Court cited three basic reasons for its decision. First, there was a general belief
that both property and nonproperty owners were affected by any decision regarding bond
elections; thus, there was no compelling state interest to justify such power being placed
1971] NOTES
tention of future litigants who might attempt to limit Phoenix to situations in
which the bonded indebtedness was to be repaid from taxes besides those of
property owners.'
The most recent federal decision to deal with the question of the constitu-
tionality of restricting eligibility to vote in bond elections to property-owning
taxpayers was Stewart v. Parish School Board.4 Stewart dealt with two basic
constitutional issues: first, whether the right to vote in school bond elections
could be limited to property taxpayers;" and second, whether a voter's ballot
could be weighed according to the monetary value of his assessed property.'
The court resolved both issues against the limitations. In the opinion of the
district court a reading of Kramer and Cipriano led to the conclusion that
"laws are unacceptable if they exclude non-property electors who have a sub-
stantial stake in the result of the election." ' The "stake" the court referred to
was more than a pecuniary interest, for the court emphasized that all persons
residing in a particular school district have a substantial stake or interest in
public education.38 The court saw that the objective sought to be achieved"9 was
in no way promoted by the exclusion of nonproperty-owning taxpayers whose
interest in public education was not less substantial than their property-owning
counterparts.
The result of these recent decisions is to limit any legislation a state might
enact in an attempt to regulate the distribution of the franchise. It has been
made clear by these decisions that any question involving voting rights will be
analyzed with exacting scrutiny. Whether any given limitation of the franchise
violates the concept of equal protection will rest upon a determination of
solely in the hands of property owners. Second, in many instances the taxes of nonproperty
owners, in the form of goods and services, as well as other local taxes, contribute to satis-
fying the debt requirements of general obligation bonds. Thus, nonproperty owners would
be directly affected by that in which they had no say. Third, the nonproperty owner even-
tually bears the burden of the tax on property in the form of increases in rent requirements.
Id. at 209-10.
' The Court said: "[TIhe justification for restricting the franchise to property owners
would seem to be strongest in the case of a municipality which, unlike Phoenix, looks only
to property tax revenues for servicing general obligation bonds. But even in such a case
the justification would be insufficient." Id. at 210 (dictum).
4310 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. La.), af/'d mein., 400 U.S. 884 (1970).
'SBy way of footnote the district court pointed out that:
[I]n Louisiana few individuals pay any personal property taxes; those who do
pay a nominal tax usually based on the value of their automobile. Louisiana
law, however, provides that 'all properties situated within the state . . . shall
be subject to taxation' . . . . Tax assessors in this state primarily place busi-
ness, commercial, and corporate personal property (merchandise inventory)
on the assessment rolls. Considerable personal property is exempt from taxa-
tion. Article 10, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution. In effect, the term
property taxpayer' equates with the term 'real property taxpayer' or 'land-
owner.
id. at 1173 n.3.
'The district court considered that the unconstitutionality of the first issue made the
determination of the second unnecessary. However, since the issues, for all practical pur-
poses, were inseparable, the court chose to render an opinion on both. Id. at 1180.
"Id. at 1176.
S11d. at 1178, 1181.
" It was determined that the interest of the state in regulating the qualifications of the
voters in school bond elections was to insure that the voters of each district had the ability
to improve the educational system within their district. Id. at 1177-78.4
"Id. at 1178.
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whether it tends to promote a compelling state interest; but, by virtue of the
current trend of the law,"1 such an interest will be quite difficult to find.'
II. MONTGOMERY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. MARTIN
In Montgomery Independent School District v. Martin" the Texas Supreme
Court held that the voter qualification of property ownership under the Texas
constitutional and statutory provisions" was so broad and universal in applica-
tion that it constituted no violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In reaching such a
decision, the court quickly eliminated the contention that the doctrines of
Kramer, Cipriano, Phoenix, and Stewart were controlling. The court concluded
that neither Kramer nor Phoenix were applicable since they involved situa-
tions in which only real property owners were allowed to vote, while the Texas
statutes had been construed to apply to both real and personal property owners.
Likewise, Cipriano was distinguished since its decision turned on the issue of
revenue bond elections. The court was of the opinion that the determinative
factor in Stewart was the weight given the ballot of each voter in accordance
with the assessed value of his property; therefore, since Texas placed equivalent
weights on all ballots cast in an election, the decision in Stewart was not ap-
plicable. The court emphasized that the real or personal property of the voter
need only appear on the tax rolls to be considered "duly rendered." It was
insignificant that the property was placed on the tax rolls by one other than the
owner. Thus, a voter was determined to be qualified to vote if, prior to the bond
election, he rendered for taxation any property of any value, even if he had
not paid the tax on it at the time of the election. By virtue of this liberal inter-
pretation of the Texas constitutional and statutory provisions, the court was of
"' Before Kramer was decided, only fourteen states still had provisions that restricted the
right to vote in elections to property owners. ALASKA CONST. art. V, 5 1; ARIZ. CONST.
art. VII, § 13; COLO. CONsT. art. XI, §§ 6, 7, 8; FLA. CONST. art. IX, 5 6; IDAHO CONST.
art. VIII, § 3; LA. CONsT. art. XIV, 14(a); MICH. CONST. art. II, 5 6; MONT. CONST.
art. IX, § 2; N.M. CONST. art. IX, 5 12; N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 2012 (McKinney 1969);
OKLA. CONST. art. X, S 27; R.I. CONsT. amend. XXIX, § 2; TEx. CoNsT. art. VI, 5 3 (a);
UTAH CONsT. art. XIV, § 3. Since Kramer the specified provisions of the states of Arizona,
Louisiana, and New York have been declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621
(1969). Likewise, the specified provisions of Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and
Utah have been declared unconstitutional by the highest court of each of those states. See
Pike v. School Dist. No. 11, 474 P.2d 162 (Colo. 1970); Muench v. Paine, 94 Idaho 12,
480 P.2d 196 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Maloney, 82 N.M. 167, 477 P.2d 605 (1970);
City of Spencer v. Rayburn, 483 P.2d 735 (Okla. 1971); Cypert v. Washington County
School Dist., 24 Utah 2d 419, 473 P.2d 887 (1970).
"Since the Supreme Court's decision in Kramer only two states, Oklahoma and Texas,
have upheld the constitutionality of challenged state constitutional provisions that limit the
right to vote in elections to property owners. In Settle v. City of Muskogee, 462 P.2d 642
(Okla. 1969), the Oklahoma Supreme Court, while applying and recognizing the principles
and standards in Krameer and Cipriano, determined that the challenged Oklahoma constitu-
tional provisions were necessary to promote the compelling state interests of municipal
solvency and protection from confiscatory taxes and therefore did not violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, some two years after the decision in
Settle the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in City of Spencer v. Rayburn, 483 P.2d 735 (Okla.
1971), determined that the same Oklahoma constitutional provision did not promote a
compelling state interest and was, therefore, in violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
43464 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1971).
"See the content of these provisions in note 1 supra.
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the opinion that anyone who really wanted to vote faced no impediment in an
attempt to qualify.
The court also noted that since the Texas Constitution was approved by the
voters of the state, the constitutional provisions merely reflected the desire of
the electorate to insure that a voter had a tangible financial stake in the out-
come of the election.' Thus, before a voter could vote to impose a tax on others,
he must be prepared to bear his distributive share of the burden. It was deter-
mined that the property ownership qualification and the requirement of ren-
dering the property for taxation as a prerequisite to the right to vote were an
inducement to owners of property to place their property on the tax rolls, the
assumption being that one who exercises the right of citizenship should also
assume its obligations.'
In the final analysis it was determined that the challenged laws did not vio-
late the concept of equal protection; rather, the laws did not confer preferential
rights on any citizen. In other words, the court was of the opinion that the
Texas constitutional and statutory provisions strengthened the precepts of the
equal protection clause because they made all voters assume the responsibilities
and obligations of citizenship as a prerequisite of the right to vote in a school
bond election.
III. A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
The Real and Personal Property Argument. State laws limiting the right to
vote are constitutionally suspect and subject to careful scrutiny to determine
whether they meet the equal protection standards established by the fourteenth
amendment." While the standards and principles established by the decisions
of the Supreme Court are not susceptible of automatic application to all ana-
logous situations, they are not strictly limited to identical facts or circumstances.
Nevertheless, in Montgomery the Texas Supreme Court determined that none
of the principles enunciated in Kramer, Cipriano, and Phoenix were applicable
since these cases dealt with laws which limited the franchise to real property
owners, while the Texas laws allowed both real and personal property owners
to vote. Is there a valid distinction between bond elections limited to real
property owners and bond elections limited to both real and personal property
owners? Montgomery merely begs the question.
The only basis for such a distinction lies in the relative number of voters
that each limitation disenfranchises. The number of individuals who may own
real property within a given district is severely limited by the amount of real
property available and the financial integrity of the electorate within that dis-
trict. In comparison, the supply of personal property is virtually unlimited, and
' But see Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen'l Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), wherein the
United States Supreme Court said: "A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed
simply because a majority of the people choose that it be." Id. at 736-37.
"The court relied upon Markowsky v. Newman, 134 Tex. 440, 136 S.W.2d 808 (1940),
for the "obligation of citizenship" philosophy. Markowsky determined that the goal sought
to be achieved by requiring the rendering of taxable property was to induce the owners of
such property to place it upon the tax rolls in order that they would be liable for their
proportionate share of the taxes assessed by the municipality. id. at 450, 136 S.W.2d at 813.
" Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1970); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1969).
NOTES19711
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the financial position of the electorate is almost insignificant. Most persons
own some personal property. The result of such distinction makes it appear that
the universe of potential voters who own either real or personal property is so
broad that almost any otherwise qualified voter could qualify to vote in a bond
election. Such rationale appears to be a criterion upon which the philosophy of
Kramer, Cipriano, and Phoenix was disregarded by the Texas Supreme Court.
Regardless of the rationale, it is extremely questionable whether the distinction
was a valid platform from which the court could proceed to disregard such
basic equal protection doctrines.
As indicated in Stewart, the principles established in Kramer were not neces-
sitated by the subject matter of the election, but rather the Court sought to
examine the New York laws because some citizens were allowed to vote while
others were denied this fundamental right.4' In Texas one is denied the right to
vote in a general obligation bond election unless he owns real or personal
property which has been rendered for taxation.4 Therefore, the mere fact that
the Texas laws allow a greater number of individuals to qualify to vote fails
to negate the fact that some individuals do not own real or personal property
and are completely denied the exercise of the franchise in general obligation
bond elections. The denial of such a fundamental right requires the application
of the compelling state interest test." As a result, any distinction between laws
limiting the franchise to real property owners or to both real or personal prop-
erty owners is no more than a superficial distinction. In both situations the
franchise is denied to some members of the electorate, and without a compel-
ling state interest such denial violates the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment."'
As with Kramer, Cipriano, and Phoenix, the Texas Supreme Court dis-
tinguished and disregarded the doctrines enunciated in Stewart. The court took
the position that the issue of the "weight" placed on each elector's vote was
the determinative factor in that case; therefore, it was determined that the
theories in that case were not applicable. However, another issue was present
in Stewart; viz., whether the state could limit the franchise in a school bond
election to property owners." By the language of the district court, this issue
was of significant importance to the decision in Stewart, and the "weight" issue
was not necessarily the controlling issue." Thus, the significance of a "property
ownership" issue makes one question the justification of the Texas Supreme
"'Stewart v. Parish School Bd., 310 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (E.D. La.), afg'd inem., 400
U.S. 884 (1970). See also Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 629
(1969).
"See note 1 supra.
"0Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
5"See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
"See note 35 supra.
"The district court said:
There are two ... issues in this case; first, the restriction of the franchise to
property taxpayers; second, the requirement that the majority of the voters
represent a 'majority of the assessed property.' Since the Court agrees with the
plaintiffs on the first issue, it might be said that it is unnecessary to reach the
second issue. But the two limitations have been inseparable since 1898.




Court in failing to mention a factor which bears a significant resemblance
to the issue raised in Montgomery.
The Scope of Interest Argument. The Texas laws clearly establish two distinct
prerequisites for entry into the voting class: (1) ownership of real or personal
property that is the subject of taxation; and (2) the rendering of such prop-
erty for taxation. 4 Those who fail to qualify are denied membership in the
class, and thereby denied the right to vote. The Texas court contended that
anyone who really desired to vote in a bond election would have no problem
satisfying these prerequisites. However, that the situation is to the contrary is
only too obvious. There are several situations in which an interested voter, who
is in no way evading his obligation to render his property for taxation, is denied
the right to exercise the franchise." The existence of such instances creates a
distinct classification of voters who are denied their constitutional rights even
though they have satisfied all the "obligations of citizenship" that the law re-
quires of them.
An additional position of the Texas court was that those who will bear the
burden of financing a bond issue should be the only ones who vote to impose
a tax obligation. In other words, only members of the electorate who maintain
a financial stake in the bond election should be allowed to vote since the
result of the election has a direct effect upon their pecuniary interests." Stewart
emphasized that elections which exclude certain individuals with a substantial
stake in the result of the election are constitutionally impermissible.' The
"stake" referred to in Stewart was not limited to pecuniary interests. Rather,
Stewart recognized that all persons residing in a particular school district have
a substantial interest, exclusive of a pecuniary interest, in public education."
All members of a given community have an interest in the result of a school
"See note 1 supra.
" The following are examples of a few situations in which persons who do not evade
the tax rendition laws are denied the right to vote under the challenged Texas constitutional
and statutory provisions: (1) Those who own only property which is exempt under the
Texas laws (see, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 19 (exempts farm products in the hands of
the producer as well as family supplies for home and farm use); TEX. CONsT. art. VIII,
§ 1, and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7150, § 11 (1960) (exempt household furniture
up to a value of $250.00)); (2) those persons who own no property whatsoever--i.e.,
paupers and those who have taken a vow of poverty; (3) those persons who rent or lease
all of their property, the taxes on such property being paid by the lessor; (4) those persons
who own taxable property in a locale other than their voting domicile, but own no taxable
property in the political district in which they vote--e.g., students or military personnel;
(5) those persons who own no taxable property within the political district on tax day;
i.e., those who own property subject to taxation in one political subdivision on tax day and
subsequent thereto, but prior to the beginning of the next tax year have moved their resi-
dence to another political subdivision. These persons are disenfranchised even though they
own property in the voting district. Brief for Relator's Motion for Rehearing at 10-11,
Montgomery Ind. School Dist. v. Martin, 464 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1971).
"6 The fallacy of this argument was recognized in Stewart in which the court said:
True, the school bonds are secured by ad valorem taxation. Property taxpayers
are faced with additional taxes for the years authorized by the bond issue;
they are subject to having a lien on their property for the life of the issue.
But if protection of the property taxpayer had been the legislature's chief
interest, the law would not have excluded business entities. These are the tax-
payers who pay the largest share of taxes in most voting districts.
Stewart v. Parish School Bd., 310 F. Supp. 1172, 1178 (E.D. La.), af/'d nem., 400 U.S.
884 (1970).
"
7 See notes 37-38 supra, and accompanying text.
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bond election, and certain individuals should not be "weeded out" because the
result of the election may not directly affect their pocketbook. It is a well-
recognized principle that the manner in which one may vote can never be
used as a criterion for prohibiting his exercise of the franchise." Therefore, the
premise of the Texas Supreme Court, that only those with a financial interest
in the bond election should be permitted to vote, is a rather tenuous position,
for it fails to recognize fully the direct and indirect interests of all segments of
the electorate.
The Compelling State Interest Argument. In Montgomery the apparent pri-
mary interest of the state was to induce property owners to render property for
taxation; i.e., to bring taxable personal property out of hiding." Whether that
was a compelling state interest was an issue which the Texas court did not
discuss. The recent cases of Kramer, Cipriano, Phoenix, and Stewart have un-
questionably established that a state is prohibited from restricting the franchise
to a particular class of voters in a limited purpose election unless there is a
clear showing of a compelling state interest. Furthermore, since the funda-
mental right of voting is involved, the restriction placed upon the electorate
must be necessary to promote the state's compelling interest."' It would logically
appear that if a law is determined to be necessary to promote a compelling
state interest, such interest would be incapable of being promoted without the
law. However, in Texas means, other than restrictions placed upon voters, are
available to induce property owners to render their property for taxation." It
would thus appear that the restrictions which the Texas laws place upon the
right to vote are not necessary to promote a compelling state interest. In fact,
it would seem that denial of the right to vote to those who fail to render their
property would have the effect of encouraging the electorate not to vote, rather
than encouraging them to render their property for taxation.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has determined that the preservation of the
fiscal integrity of a state is not a compelling state interest when it infringes
upon one's constitutional right to move freely from state to state." The right to
vote is of equivalent, if not greater, importance than the right to move freely
from state to state. It is extremely doubtful that a law that promotes the render-
ing of property for taxation, a situation quite analogous to the preservation
of the fiscal integrity of a state, would be considered valid in light of the right
upon which it infringes, the right to vote.
The Taxation Argument. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections the United
States Supreme Court determined that "[vjoter qualifications have no relation
to wealth nor to paying ... [a poll tax] or any other tax."" Therefore, even
"'Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
"464 S.W.2d at 641.
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 205, 208-09 (1970); Cipriano v. City
of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395
U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Stewart v. Parish School Bd., 310 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (E.D. La.),
aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 884 (1970).
62See, e.g., TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 125 (1952), which levies a fine upon any person
who either refuses or neglects to render his property for taxation when called upon to do so.
" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
" 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
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if every voter, otherwise qualified, in the state of Texas had property to render
for taxation and qualified to vote in a school bond election, the unconstitution-
ality of the Texas constitutional and statutory provisions would nevertheless
exist since they tend to create a class of voters based upon the satisfaction of a
voting requirement not too much unlike a poll tax.' Under the challenged
Texas laws one incurs a tax liability upon rendering property for taxation.
Thus, the mere fact that these laws allow one to vote in a bond election with-
out actually having paid any tax is insufficient to remove them from the scope
of state activity proscribed by Harper. The fact remains that one can avoid the
eventual payment of the tax or the possible foreclosure of the tax lien only if
the state chooses not to collect the tax that has been levied. Logically, it would
appear that the state cannot qualify the right to vote upon the rendition of
property for taxation, especially since it is prohibited from qualifying that right
upon the payment of any tax.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Montgomery seeks to end a great deal of confusion in the area of
Texas school bond elections, it falls far short of that goal. The apparent lack
of a willingness to come face-to-face with basic constitutional issues places the
Texas bond election requirements in a state of irresolution. Even though the
court upheld the Texas voting requirements, the manner in which this was
done leaves a great deal to be desired.
While there are certain obligations expected from every citizen, it is ex-
tremely doubtful that one's inability to meet his "obligation of citizenship"
would be a sufficient basis to deny him equal protection of the law. Neverthe-
less, if the particular obligation sought to be obtained from an individual was
one which was necessary to promote a compelling state interest, then such a
situation would warrant a denial of equal protection." Since the issue of a com-
pelling state interest was not expressly discussed by the Texas Supreme Court,
it leaves one wondering whether the rendering of property for taxation is neces-
sary to promote such an interest.
One reason for the avoidance of a direct confrontation with the compelling
state interest test may rest in the apparent absence of such a constitutionally
compelling interest. But again this forces one to question the wisdom of the
supreme court in entirely avoiding an issue so fundamental to the equal pro-
tection clause. While the "obligation of citizenship" argument raised by the
court" merits some philosophical discussion, it is extremely questionable that
the discussion of an issue as important as voting rights and the compelling state
interest question should be neglected under the auspices of a theoretical "you
can't get something for nothing" attitude.
Barry M. Bloom
e In 1966 a three-judge federal district court held that making the payment of a Texas
poll tax a prerequisite to vote was a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
"Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963).
"7464 S.W.2d at 641.
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